‘Slender Knowledge’: Sovereignty, Madness, and the Self in Shakespeare’s King Lear by Harmon, A.G.
The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law 
CUA Law Scholarship Repository 
Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions Faculty Scholarship 
2008 
‘Slender Knowledge’: Sovereignty, Madness, and the Self in 
Shakespeare’s King Lear 
A.G. Harmon 
The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/scholar 
 Part of the English Language and Literature Commons 
Recommended Citation 
A.G. Harmon, ‘Slender Knowledge’: Sovereignty, Madness, and the Self in Shakespeare’s King Lear, 4 L. 
CULTURE & HUMAN. 402 (2008). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions by an authorized 
administrator of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
“Slender Knowledge”:
Sovereignty, Madness, and the
Self in Shakespeare’s King Lear
A.G. Harmon
The Catholic University of America,Washington, D.C.
In King Lear, the English law of madness, especially the aspects of testament-
ary devises, royal accession, waste, and plunder, is thematized in such a way
that the conflict between civil order and savage nature is brought to the fore-
ground. This dynamic overshadows, and to some extent disguises what truly
lies at the heart of ancient Britain’s woes: a deficit of ontological self-inquiry
on the part of the sovereign and his royal retainer, Gloucester, from which
all of the other complications ensue.
In the summer of 1453, while at a royal hunting lodge in Clarendon, what
had for years been rumored of the English monarch Henry VI finally came
to pass: a sudden terror befell the King, an attack that was immediately
succeeded by a withdrawal from life so complete that he would not speak,
move, wash, or even dress of his own accord. For five years this “darkness”
held the monarch, during which time the war of the roses ripened.1 The
trouble of an incapacitated sovereign had presented itself not too many
years earlier in France, in the case of Henry’s grandfather. Charles VI, at
the age of thirty-four, had his first fit of madness while on campaign in 
Brittany, turning upon and attacking his own soldiers.2
During such times, an understandable anxiety gripped the respective courts.
When the sovereign is not dead but incapable (as Henry was when acceding
to the crowns of both England and France at the age of one year), how is the
realm to be ruled? When the sovereign is the realm, and the realm has gone
mad, the stuff of drama is made. This is so not only because such a quandary is
fictively provocative, but also because it is philosophically riveting. For the
© 2008 Association for the Study of Law, Culture and the Humanities 10.1177/1743872108093105
Law, Culture and the Humanities 2008; 4: 403–423
Address for correspondence: A.G. Harmon, The Columbus School of Law, The Catholic
University of America, Washington, D.C., 20064. E-mail: harmon@law.edu
1. Vivian Green, The Madness of Kings (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 62. Henry
“arose” from his madness in 1455, though evidence suggests there were relapses for the
rest of his life. Ibid., 68.
2. Ibid., 74. In medieval Europe, royalty was beset by what is now considered schizophrenia.
Joan the Mad, Queen of Spain, first displayed irrational behavior due to the philander-
ing of her husband, Philip the Fair, then became completely deranged upon his death,
refusing to leave his corpse. Ibid., 90–1. In Shakespeare’s own day, the war-filled reign
of Sweden’s Eric XIV, a suitor to Elizabeth II, ended in insanity and imprisonment.
Ibid., 128–37.
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people of that day and of this, the point was not merely academic or dramatic;
it was something against which to prepare, to make contingencies, and above
all, to avoid. Madness was so dangerous in the context of the monarch because
in such instances reason, considered the “sovereign of the mind,” had been
thrust from its throne.3 In short, madness was seen as a kind of political sedi-
tion, the overthrow of all that was lawful. And from this dramatic and philo-
sophic conundrum, Shakespeare made his greatest tragedy.4
For a good number of critics, it seems settled that King Lear crosses into
madness in Act 3, Scene 4.5 However long he has feared it, whatever signs
have augured it, whichever lines display hints of it, when Lear projects his
own plight onto the suddenly-appearing Tom, his madness is manifest. But
if attention is moved to a statement occurring fifteen lines earlier from this
confrontation, there occurs another confrontation–one that Lear himself
names and shrinks from:
O Regan, Goneril, whose frank heart gave you all, —
O that way madness lies, let me shun that;
No more of that. (3.4.21–2) (emphasis mine)6
R.A. Foakes says by “that way” Lear means “dwelling on his own griefs.”7
Under this interpretation, Lear believes that to dwell upon the injustices
perpetrated against him would precipitate his insanity. Certainly, it is con-
sistent with Lear’s rage and temperament that he should consider this the
road to madness. But the fact is, despite his self-admonition, he does indeed
go mad a few lines later; further, he is wrong about the way that has led
him there. Nothing in the play establishes a direct causal link between his
dwelling upon his maltreatment and his lunacy. In fact, from the time that
he names and shuns that “way” to the time that he asks Tom whether his
3. Duncan Salkeld, Madness and Drama in the Age of Shakespeare (New York: Manchester
University Press, 1993), 81.
4. Further interest in such matters might have been suggested to Shakespeare by the case
of Brian Annesley, a gentleman pensioner to Queen Elizabeth who had lost his senses.
The eldest of his three daughters sought to have the old man committed, whereas his
youngest, named “Cordel,” petitioned to take custody of him. The events transpired in
1603; King Lear was published in 1605. Geoffrey Bullough, Narrative and Dramatic
Sources of Shakespeare (New York: Columbia University. Press, 1958), 7:270. In addition,
Shakespeare’s first tetralogy is chiefly made up of the life of Henry VI, though he does
not address the historical madness of the king in the plays.
5. See, e.g., Josephine Waters Bennett, “The Storm Within: The Madness of Lear,”
Shakespeare Quarterly 13, no. 2 (1962): 137–55. For a different view, see Sholom J. Kahn,
“‘Enter Lear mad,’” Shakespeare Quarterly 8, no. 3 (1957): 311–9. Coppelia Kahn argues
Lear’s madness results from rage at maternal deprivation and suppression of the
“mother.” Coppelia Kahn, “The Absent Mother in King Lear,” in Rewriting the Renais-
sance: The Discourses of Sexual Difference in Early Modern Europe, ed. Margaret W. Ferguson,
Maureen Quilligan, and Nancy J. Vickers (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986),
33–49. This gendering of the King’s madness as feminine to which Carol Thomas Neely
cannot subscribe. Carol Thomas Neely, Distracted Subjects: Madness and Gender in
Shakespeare and Early Modern Culture (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 63 n. 23.
6. William Shakespeare, King Lear, Arden ed., ed. R.A. Foakes (New York: Nelson & Sons, 1997).
7. Ibid., 272 n. 21.
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daughters have brought him to this pass, he only speaks of two things: that
the tempest serves as a distraction from his troubles, and that he has too lit-
tle tended the plight of the wretched (3.4.24–36). Neither is related to “filial
ingratitude.” That complaint is made while in the midst of his mental
decline. It is symptomatic of the cause, not the cause itself. Whatever else
drives him insane, it is not brooding upon the wrongs done him. So what is
the “way”? What is the cause? And what does a proper understanding of it
reveal?
Arguments can and have been made, and some long assumed; among
them: Lear’s wrath, his shock, or both things taken in conjunction with his
frailty.8 But none of those reasons are particularly profound or imaginatively
provocative; they are even rather pedestrian for a play that is considered
the greatest that the great playwright offered, and also his most psychological.9
In fact, there is another reason that is consistent with the play’s metaphysical
ponderings, and which lies at the root of what the king is, or should be, in
relation to his kingdom. The way to disorder Lear does not know and can-
not see–typical of both him and his cohort Gloucester–is disclosed in the
way that language is used in the play, and in what the King calls upon the
law to do. In this greatest of tragedies, an epistemological confusion residing
in the king/judge/law-giver both shakes the foundation of the kingdom and
mortally compromises the culture. The way to Lear’s madness, when rightly
understood, reveals a negative trajectory for the sovereign to avoid. It also
provides an Elizabethan perspective on man’s historic disengagement from
reality and the cultural damage sustained thereby.
The gravity of what is lost in the chaos of Lear’s madness can be expli-
cated in terms of the historic laws concerning madness, and the role that
the King played in their disposition. Carol Thomas Neely points out that
“madness” was not a particularly dominant term by which to refer to the
many recognized manifestations of mental distress in the Renaissance;
melancholy was the more typical “catch-all.”10 But the dangers of the still-
powerful but deranged citizen were acknowledged, regardless of the particu-
lar nomenclature. By a lost statute of Edward I, the King of England was
given custody of subjects and their inheritances when the subjects were
classified as insane.11 In addition, by the statute de praerogativa Regis of
Edward II (17 Edw. II. St. 2 c.9) “[i]t was provided that the King should
8. E.g., Kenneth Muir, introduction to King Lear, by William Shakespeare, Arden ed., ed.
Kenneth Muir, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University. Press, 1952), xlviii; 
H. Somerville, Madness in Shakespearian Tragedy (London: Richard’s Press, 1927), 101;
Jerome Mazarro, “Madness and Memory: Shakespeare’s Hamlet and King Lear,” Com-
parative Drama 19, no. 2 (1985): 109.
9. Sigmund Freud, Complete Psychological Works, trans. and ed. James Strachey (New York:
W.W. Norton, 1958) 12:291–301. According to Harold Bloom, Freud had to grudgingly
concede that Shakespeare invented the “psyche.” Harold Bloom, The Western Canon: The
Books and School of the Ages (New York: Harcourt Grace, 1994), 60–1. Philip Armstrong’s
recent work explores the influence Shakespeare has had on psychoanalysts. Shakespeare
in Psychoanalysis (London: Routledge, 2001).
10. Neely, 1.
11. Henry F. Buswell, The Law of Insanity (Boston: Little, Brown, 1885), 40.
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have the custody of the lands of natural fools, taking the profits of them
without waste or destruction, and should find them in necessaries, render-
ing the lands, after the death of the idiot, to the right heirs.” The same
statute provided that if any who had lost their wits were to have “lucid
intervals,” (i.e., a “lunatic,” not an “idiot”) or were ever to return to their
right minds, their property should be returned without the King’s taking
anything to his own use (c.10).12 Henry VIII set up a wardship tribunal to
manage the persons and property of the insane (32 Henry VIII. c. 46),
though it was later disbanded under Charles II and the old custodial rela-
tionship reinstated (12 Charles II c. 24).13 The thrust of these royal pro-
nouncements was to establish some means of caretaking, not only for
insane persons, but also for what they owned. The afflicted could not lay
waste to their property, nor could any potential profiteer or abuser do so.
That way, the disordered minds would not wreak havoc upon their lands
nor dispossess those who should inherit them. The King, as such, was safe-
guard against this threat, a royal wall of authority to prevent the further
fracture of a world already fractured enough.
But what if that wall itself is fractured, the safeguard somehow comprom-
ised? More precisely, what if the King himself is mad, and the lands that
risk forfeiture are his kingdom? The problem in King Lear is the legal insti-
tution that should protect the forfeiture, the waste, the dispossession, is one
and the same as that which has caused the forfeiture, waste, and disposses-
sion: The edifice meant to contain and repel has cracked, and there is noth-
ing to stop the devastation that ensues or the dissolution that results.
Indeed, with relentless regularity, the ground keeps slipping out from
under the characters’ feet, all the way until the final scene. Even then, it
can hardly be argued that what has befallen ancient Britain is not ruinous.
Though Edgar and Albany are left standing at the play’s close, this may
indeed be “the promised end” (5.3.261). So if the play centralizes the
importance of the institution’s integrity – and the institution is here instan-
tiated in the person of the King – especially in its prevention of this chaos,
how could it all have been prevented? What is the “way” to be avoided?
In King Lear, when the faculty of reason is assaulted, and finally
destroyed, it is assaulted by what was understood by the Elizabethans to be
its opposite, the appetite. In Shakespeare’s comedies, the appetite and the
“will” are synonymous, and are always opposed to reason.14 The difference
here is that the appetite/will has a larger counterpart in Lear, one revealed
in the howling tempest, the greed for power, the lust of the unconsecrated
bed. Unlike the meliorative role she plays in the festive comedies and prob-
lem plays,15 here Nature has a savage face, and appears in her reddest
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. A.G. Harmon, Eternal Bonds, True Contracts: Law and Nature in Shakespeare’s Problem Plays
(Albany: State University. of New York Press, 2004), 60, 148.
15. Ibid., 78.
guise. From the outset, the bastard Edmund is her representative (though
he is not alone in that role). “Nature” is his goddess, and to her “law” 
(a facetious use of the term) are his services bound (1.2.1–2). With her help,
the illegitimate Edmund will top his legitimate brother Edgar, have his “land”
(1.2.16) by his “wits” (1.2.181); and is promised that very land by their
father, who will find a way to seise16 Edmund of all he cannot inherit as a
bastard.17 Law will be undone by lawlessness, order trumped by raw
appetite (2.183–5). In larger terms, the principle of abundance/generation
that is identical with Nature in the comedies and problem plays is resisted
here. The law that in those plays served as a means by which Nature’s gen-
erative ends are met is now opposed by a different kind of Nature, one bent
on the destruction of order and generation. In a real sense, the “Nature” of
the comedies (both festive and problem) is opposed by the “Nature” of this
tragedy.18 But for this “tragic” Nature to triumph over order, she must first
defeat reason. Under the right circumstances, however fiercely she may
rage at the walls, reason will keep her out. Unless, that is, either reason
cracks, or Nature is let inside, willingly; the effect in both instances is chaos.
It is the argument here that the King opens the doors to his own mad-
ness and to his consequent destruction. And the way that Lear goes about
making this fissure in reason is not by “dwelling” on his daughters’ filial
ingratitude, nor in failing the patience he promises to practice, nor even in
exposing himself to the physical and mental buffets brought about by his
rage, but by scanting knowledge, reason. However, the knowledge meant
here is of a particular kind, which Shakespeare makes quite clear. It is
knowledge of himself in which Lear is deficient. Regan says of him,
famously: “yet he hath ever but slenderly known himself” (1.1.294–5). And
in failing to observe that foremost of Greek philosophical maxims
(	
 – or, in Latin translation, nosce teipsum – inscribed on
the temple of Apollo at Delphi), Lear lets Nature eat her way out, from the
inside.
The interaction between law, madness, sovereignty, and the self, which
is analyzed below, springs foremost from the line of scholarship focusing
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16. “Seisen” is the term designating legal possession, and in Renaissance times involved a
literal conveyance of some piece of the land – a handful of dirt, for example – to effect
transferal. To “seise” someone in this sense is to bring him into rightful ownership. See
B.J. Sokol and Mary Sokol, Shakespeare’s Legal Language (New Brunswick, NJ.: Althone
Press, 2000), 69.
17. Sokol and Sokol point out that bastardy was not only common in England and through-
out Europe, up until the sixteenth century, it was common for bastards to be publicly
claimed. And by the Statute of Wills 1540, a legitimate son such as Edward could be dis-
inherited. Ibid., 29. Still, there was no legal way for Edmund, as a bastard, to be made
“capable” of the lands as Gloucester promises. Paul S. Clarkson and Clyde T. Warren,
The Law of Property in Shakespeare and the Elizabethan Drama (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1942), 226.
18. John Danby posits that the two opposed ideas of Nature are those of Hooker, whose
Nature is benign and harmonious, and that of what would later be understood as the
Hobbesian idea of Nature, more akin to power and vigor. See generally John F. Danby,
Shakespeare’s Doctrine of Nature: A Study of “King Lear” (London: Faber & Faber, 1949).
19. Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press. 1989), 16.
20. Taylor says this is the one constant in the modern view – that there is no shared frame-
work is now “the framework tout court.” Ibid, 17.
21. Ibid., 27.
22. Ibid., 34.
upon the early modern concept of the “self” as integral to culture. There-
fore, the works of Charles Taylor and Stephen Greenblatt provide broad
contextualization for the discussion that follows. Taylor’s explanation of
the “sources” of the self for the early modern up to the time of the Refor-
mation, and the change in this understanding afterward, provides a key to
grasping Lear’s “vertigo” on the planes of self-knowledge. In addition,
Greenblatt’s concept of “self-fashioning” supports this view in accounting
for the false construction Lear has made of his identity. Proceeding from
this understanding of the issues involved in “selfhood,” the work of Michel
Foucault and Carol Thomas Neely provide further contextualization in 
the realm of what madness – with its variety of Renaissance forms and 
aspects – meant culturally, with particular emphasis on drama’s provision of
important dichotomies and distinctions. Finally, to these concentric circles
of selfhood and madness is added another ring of commentary, that
which draws upon sovereignty, the law, and order. The work of Ernst
Kantorowicz contributes here. Within the core of these concentric circles
of analysis lies what is central to a better understanding of each – a linguistic
analysis of stative verbs, and their employment by the playwright as a
means to illustrate Lear’s dislocated self. When that self is the sovereign,
and the sovereign is seen as the physical manifestation of the polity, the
stable placement of that self is crucial to forestalling a chaos that constantly
threatens order.
The Greek maxim counseling self-knowledge mentioned above begs the
question of what exactly Lear would have “known” if he had known him-
self; what he would have done, in light of that knowledge; and how he
would have gone about obtaining it. Charles Taylor argues that the dom-
inant pre-modern understanding of the self acknowledged that some
“framework stands unquestioned which helps define the demands by
which they [the members of the society] judge their lives and measure, as it
were, their fullness or emptiness: the space of fame in the memory and
song of the tribe, or the call of God as made clear in revelation, or, to take
another example, the hierarchical order of being in the universe.”19 The
modern view, in opposition, questions the “horizon” by which people
shared and oriented their existences.20 In other words, to know the self is
to know the self in relationship to a particular stance, an identification with
a set of answers to a set of questions, and thereby define the self by valuing
what is good or what is to be done.21 Selves are not possessed in the same
sense that we have organs, says Taylor, but we are “only selves insofar as
we move in a certain space of questions, as we seek and find an orientation
to the good.”22 This necessitates a relationship between the self and a
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community of interlocutors, by which and through which the self is known
and communicated. The self therefore exists only within what Taylor calls
“webs of interlocution.”23
Stephen Greenblatt’s concept of the “fashioned self” is consistent with
Taylor’s understanding, but it focuses upon how the “self” can be con-
structed vis-à-vis “others” – including both some kind of authority and
some kind of alien – in dialectical terms.24 The examples he draws upon in
Spenser, Wyatt, More, and Shakespeare, all happen to exemplify fashion-
ings that are more or less self-deceptions; that is, they are only as strong as
the conceit. With regard to King Lear, Greenblatt’s view is pertinent, in
that the King’s superficial “self” is a construct born of solipsism, of “self”-
centeredness. This stems not only from his failure to reside within a “web
of interlocution,” but also brings about the dissociation of reason from the
self, and sets about his de facto “dethroning.” This self insurrection creates
the political insurrection to come. Lear’s lack of self-knowledge isolates
him, de-locates him. And since he is the sovereign, the failure has more
than local effect. Ontological ignorance with regard to the self leads to a
kind of “self-banishment” from the community, resulting in disorientation,
and eventually divestment. Tragic Nature lurks to rush in to the disorder.
If the web of interlocution is not maintained – is cut, in fact, by the sov-
ereign – the sovereign removes himself from the interpretive community,
and madness becomes the metaphor for the naturalistic chaos that follows.
The point here is that the governor’s sense of self is even more closely tied
to the welfare of the state than is often realized; whence it goes, so goes the
kingdom. In other words, the “philosopher king” is not an ideal, but a
necessity.
Lear was “ignorant of himself,” as Regan says, before he was mad. Had
he existed within the interpretive community, he would have presumably
learned not what a pagan British chieftain would have known, nor even a
Greek philosopher, but what the playwright’s community considered at
the root of the personhood.25 Sidney best articulates the Renaissance “self,”
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23. Ibid., 36.
24. Stephan Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1980), 9.
25. Paul Jorgensen’s mid-twentieth century work chronicles scholarly opinion on what
“knowing the self” meant. He does so from the related perspective of self-discovery
rather than self-knowledge; his aim is an explanation of dramatic agnorisis (i.e., “recogni-
tion”), while the intention here is ontological essence. Paul A. Jorgensen, Lear’s Self Dis-
covery (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 2. By and large, Jorgensen says
self-knowledge was the basic wisdom essential to right conduct, and the ability to distin-
guish one’s limitations (i.e., humility), thereby guarding against what is evil. Ibid., 4.
Historically, most critics consider a character’s realization that “a mistake has been
made” as equivalent to self-discovery. Ibid., 6. Likewise, contrary to the view expressed
here, most critics find Lear to have obtained that knowledge, however imperfectly, by
the end of the play. Ibid., 107; Bennett, The Madness of Lear, 153; Manfred Weidhorn,
“Lear’s Schoolmasters,” Shakespeare Quarterly 13, no. 3 (1962): 313; Robert B. Heilman,
“Twere Best not Know myself: Othello, Lear, Macbeth,” Shakespeare Quarterly 15, no. 2
(1964): 94. A proponent for an opposite view is that of Warren Taylor, who claims that
Lear’s self remains lost to him. Warren Taylor, “Lear and the Lost Self,” College 
and reveals it to be a dishonored core whose “erected wit” (i.e., “reason”) is
subject to the “infected will” (i.e., appetite) by virtue of its fall from grace.26
And unless this reality is acknowledged, fully, the wit can never master the
will. Even with a clear understanding of this self-knowledge, the struggle to
gain the upper hand over the appetite is never-ending and arduous.27 It
requires concessions be made to one’s faults and inabilities. Otherwise, the
ground of the self from which all judgments rise will not be truly known,
and hence no judgments properly made, since not arising from right rea-
son. And if not made from right reason, then all judgments are accidental,
and only await the proper set of circumstances for catastrophe to follow
from mistake. But “reason” and its relationship to concepts of the “self”
have a complicated history, one that grew particularly complex in the six-
teenth century.
Foucault’s work on the history of insanity explains one dimension of the
malady that is particularly relevant here. The mad, like the leprous, were
considered fearful and scorn-worthy from the early perspective, but they
also retained an aura of the supernatural about them. The visitation of the
scourge could be seen as the gift of suffering, a mortal badge of soul-sick-
ness, obtaining for the sufferer a kind of white martyrdom, as it were.28
This may in some way rise from another Renaissance idea that Foucault
considers – the “madness of the cross.” The great irrational sacrifice of God
for man – the scandal of the cross, as it is known – rebuked man’s pride.
But this metaphor was gradually changed. “When classical Christianity
speaks of the madness of the cross, it is merely to humiliate false reason
and add luster to the eternal light of truth,” says Foucault.29 The sanctified
was sanitized, converted into a respectable point in apologetics. Further,
Carol Thomas Neely’s work explains how derangement shifted from being
perceived as a state part demonic, part divine, part human in nature, to a
kind of demystified phenomenon. Drama’s encoding of certain language –
through inflection, italicization, marking – provided the audience with a
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English 25, no. 7 (1964): 509–13. While I agree with his conclusion, Taylor’s focus is on
“self” in the sense of the “kind of man Lear could have been but was not,” that is, the
depth of soul, perspicacity of vision, etc., his character could have risen to, but never
did. Again, that kind of “self” is not ontological, and therefore not the focus here.
Another view, complementary to mine and Taylor’s but from a different angle, is that of
David Collington, who says Lear fails in practicing what Montaigne calls “Solitarinesse.”
David P. Collington, “Self-Discovery in Montaigne’s ‘Of Solitarinesse’ and King Lear,”
Comparative Drama 35, no. 3 (2001): 247–69. Carol Thomas Neely makes the same point
as is made here: the state is too dislocated for the resolution suggested by these read-
ings. Neely, Distracted Subjects, 64 n. 25.
26. Sir Philip Sidney, The Defense of Poesy, ed. Albert S. Cook (Boston: Ginn, 1890), 8–9.
27. See Augustine, “Of Nature and Grace: Against Pelagius,” in The Anti-Pelagian Works of St.
Augustine, trans. Peter Holmes (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1872), 253–6. Augustine draws
upon St. Paul’s lament over the belligerence of the carnal state despite all rationality.
Ibid., 282. A recent work contends that Shakespeare’s poetics draws upon Augustine.
Lisa Freinkel, Reading Shakespeare’s Will (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).
28. Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason
(New York: Pantheon, 1965).
29. Ibid., 78.
means to make cultural distinctions.30 In the case of Lear, Neely says, “the
supernatural explanations [of madness] are completely abandoned since
Lear suffers from natural madness and the supernatural possession that
Edgar assumes in his role as Poor Tom is explicitly feigned.”31 Exorcism
becomes unnecessary when the altered state can be addressed by a “cure.”
The change in the perceptions of madness that Foucault speaks of, and
the abandonment of the supernatural that Neely explains, are consistent
with the Reformational shift regarding the “good life” that Charles Taylor
identifies. The amendment of evaluative mechanisms to exclude what lies
outside the “ordinary world” is consistent with the Reformational hallo-
wing of the immediate – the “here and now.” Reflective states, contempla-
tive enquiries, become highly suspicious, even selfish, as they focus on the
good of the self rather than that of the multitude. They provide nothing
practical for the common welfare.32 It is likely they were also considered to
smack of monasticism, and from the Reformer’s perspective, the worst type
of monasticism – the cloister.33
Taylor traces this change to Augustine.34 The inwardness that Augustine
advocated as a means to know the self in relation to God is subtly changed
over time: rather than move the gaze from the outside to the inside,
thereby finding a way to God; the Reformer also moves the eyes from the
“higher” life, the contemplative, to the ordinary life of practical, lived experi-
ence. The sifting of one’s soul is done not to achieve ever greater com-
munion with God, but to live a better, more productive life here on earth.
Since for the Reformer all are depraved and none can come closer to God
by his own merits or achievements, and since God’s grace alone provides
for salvation, reflective spirituality is increasingly marginal.35 For purposes
of the argument here, the history that Foucault, Neely, and Taylor explain
sets up a trajectory that excludes from the “rational” and “reasonable” any-
thing that is speculative, reflective, mystical. The use of “reason” to oppose
the chaos of raw nature no longer includes all the “sources” of the self, as
Taylor would have it, that were previously available; as such, these sources
shrink to consist of only the purely “practical,” a forerunner to what 
will later become the strict scientific view. Ironically, this shrunken “land-
scape” is also consistent with a materialist, solipsistic view, which is con-
cerned with the immediate and appetitive, and will be satisfied despite
conflicting realities. This is Lear’s dilemma. He has not availed himself of
the interpretive community, and therefore has fashioned himself as the
center of existence; he centers upon himself, never seeking the center
within himself.
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30. Neely, Distracted Subjects, 23.
31. Ibid., 59.
32. Taylor, Sources of the Self, 104.
33. Ibid. 185; 216–7.
34. Ibid., 129.
35. Eventually, says Taylor, the religious context is supplanted altogether by modern
utilitarian and materialist ideologies. Taylor, Sources of the Self, 13.
However Augustine was understood or misunderstood by the Reform-
ers, he is a catalyst and pivotal point in ways of knowing. For Augustine,
“the outer is the bodily, what we have in common with the beasts, including
even our senses, and the memory storage of our images of outer things.
The inner is the soul. . . .” Said Augustine, “Do not go outward; return
within yourself. In the inward man dwells truth.”36 Most importantly, says
Taylor, “Augustine shifts the focus from the field of objects known to the
activity itself of knowing; God is to be found there. This begins to account
for his use of the language of inwardness. For in contrast to the domain of
objects, which is public and common, the activity of knowing is particular-
ized; each of us is engaged in ours. To look towards this activity is to look
to the self, to take up a reflexive stance.”37 As a result, the language of
inwardness marks the discourse as reflective–as focused on comprehension,
not mere apprehension.
The very language of “knowing” used in King Lear supports the conclusion
that self-knowledge is integral to the forestalling of an all-too-ready chaos. In
the context of the sovereign – the lawgiver and caretaker – linguistic evidence
of the lack of that self-knowledge presages the fracture of the kingdom. In
short, language highlights the epistemological dynamics in the “way to Lear’s
madness,” and of paramount importance is the use of the verb “know.”38
Linguists explain that one type of stative verb, i.e., verbs that express an
unchanging state or condition, is that which conveys a private state. These
states can only be subjectively verified.39 Among this group are intellectual
states, such as “know,” “believe,” “wonder,” etc. Only we can honestly
judge whether we know something or not, only we can look into the inter-
ior of ourselves, clearly, to consult that cache of things we call knowledge.
Foremost among that cache is what we are. Consequently, the truth that
what a person “knows” can only be subjectively verified is joined by an
attendant truth: what others may “know” of us, of our true “selves” – i.e ..,
what they know of what we know – comes only through what we reveal.
This interior is communicated only through verbs that express the private
intellectual state – what I term “portal” verbs. These are words through
which we express our knowledge of our selves. In addition, if we know
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38. Just as the unities become exponential in the multiple marriages of the problem plays and
festive comedies, the disunities become exponential here. But rather as metaphoric sep-
arations, one becoming two, this disunity should be seen as metaphoric death – one divid-
ing, then dying; every separation in King Lear leads to death. The scene most symbolic of
this death spiral reduction is 2.2, in which the daughters who began the play vying to
express their inexpressible love for their father turn and vie to diminish his retinue:
GONERIL. What need you five and twenty? Ten? Or Five? (2.2.450).
REGAN. What need one? (2.2.453).
In essence, since Lear sees his men as vestiges of himself, Regan and Goneril divide and
waste the King, just as he has done his kingdom.
39. Randolph Quirk et al., A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language (New York:
Longman, 1985), 202–03.
ourselves – what we are – we can use ourselves as epistemological tools by
which to rightly know what other things are, to gather into ourselves a right
understanding that enriches the cache of what is known. The meaning of
the pronoun is key, because ontologies are based in “what-ness,” not in
“who-ness” – i.e., in essence, not in appearance. Indeed, to re-cognize some-
thing truly, we must first know (cognoscere) it truly, remember it from a first
understanding of its essence. The failure to know substances can comprom-
ise the ability to distinguish forms and can lead to a world filled with
phantasms. Only in probing inwardly, “looking” sightlessly for that which
is beyond sight – the self – can we learn how to see beyond that which pres-
ents itself to the eye; only then do we know what to look for.
In his use of the portal verb “know,”40 Lear reveals that he has no know-
ledge of what things are, and as a result even begins to question who they
are. In contrast to those who both truly “see” real essences – Kent and
Cordelia – his use of “know” is most often in the sense of “recognition” of
something or someone, and never in the strict sense of an “appreciation” of
its essence.
Know that we have divided In three our kingdom (1.1.35). (emphasis
mine)
Dost thou know me, fellow? (1.4.26). (emphasis mine)
Doth any here know me? (1.4.216). (emphasis mine)
I know thee well enough; thy name is Gloucester (4.6.173). (emphasis
mine)
I am a king,
My masters, know you that (4.6.196). (emphasis mine)
He seldom moves beyond recognizing the form to understanding the
essence, and when he does, he is most often wrong:
[to Cordelia] You are a spirit, I know: when did you die? (4.7.49) (empha-
sis mine)
[to Cordelia] If you have poison for me, I will drink it. / I know you do
not love me (4.7.73). (emphasis mine)
His usage of the word becomes more and more tentative, until it confesses
only a lack of knowledge, a lack of understanding:
I will have such revenges on you both,
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40. The verb has many aspects, including the familiar sense of “recognition” (Oxford English
Dictionary, 2006 ed., s.v. “know” 1.1.b) and to have cognizance through observation and
inquiry (Oxford English Dictionary, 2006 ed., s.v. “know” III.8). But the end of the fif-
teenth century brings the last recorded appearances of the verb in the transitive sense of “to
confess, own, or admit” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2006 ed., s.v. “know” 3.a.) and “to
confess oneself to be something.” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2006 ed., s.v. “know” 3.b.).
That all the world shall – I will do such things, –
What they are, yet I know not (2.2.470). (emphasis mine)
I know not what to say (4.7.54). (emphasis mine)
[N]or I know not
Where I did lodge last night (4.7.67). (emphasis mine)
His only use of the term in the strict sense, an appreciation of the essence
of things, is in terms of death. And even here, Lear shrinks from reality. He
immediately forsakes what he truly “knows” and instead embraces the fan-
tasy that Cordelia lives yet:
I know when one is dead, and when one lives;
She’s dead as earth. Lend me a looking-glass;
If that her breath will mist or stain the stone,
Why, then she lives (5.3.258–60). (emphasis mine)
Gloucester, his fellow in ontological ignorance, uses the word in the same
facile way of recognition:
Do you know this noble gentleman, Edmund? (1.1.24) (emphasis mine)
You know the character to be your brother’s? (1.2.62). (emphasis mine)
Dost thou know Dover? (4.1.74). (emphasis mine)
[of Lear] I know that voice (4.6.95). (emphasis mine)
[to Lear] Dost thou know me? (4.6.131). (emphasis mine)
He does not “know” the character of his legitimate son Edgar, nor the true
character of his bastard son Edmund, taking even that word in its literal
sense, handwriting, rather than its figural and ontological sense. When
blind, Gloucester asks only if the mad Lear recognizes him; Lear can sat-
isfy him in that sense, as the King’s eyes are not out, though his reason has
long dimmed. Again, like Lear, Gloucester’s usage is often in terms of a
confession as to what he does not know:
I know not why he comes (2.1.79). (emphasis mine)
I know not, madam: ‘tis too bad, too bad (2.1.96). (emphasis mine)
He calls to horse; but will I know not whither (2.2.487). (emphasis mine)
This failure to “know” unsettles even the ability to recognize. Lear begins
to question what he sees and is tentative in his responses to what he has
previously assumed. “Are you our daughter?” he asks Goneril upon her
refusal of him (1.4.209) “Regan, I think you are,” says Lear, about to suffer
his second rebuff (2.2.315); and “I think this lady; To be my child
Cordelia,” (4.7.68) he says, after his rescue. He even loses knowledge of his
own identity: “Who is it that can tell me who I am? (1.4.221)” Of course,
this is perhaps the most profound example of how wrong his inquiries are.
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Lear asks who he is, not what he is. Like the Fisher King of Arthurian legend,
the kingdom cannot be cured until the right question is put to the sover-
eign. But here Lear himself does not know what to ask. The Fool’s answer
to his question – “Lear’s shadow” (1.4.222) – drives home the point in Pla-
tonic terms: the depth of his “unreality”– the shadow, not the substance.
Lear’s own essence is hidden to him.
A few characters use the terms in the strict ontological sense, knowing
“essences.” Predictably, they include the banished retainer, Kent:
[of Edmund] I must love you, and sue to know you better [know what
you are] (1.1.29). (emphasis mine)
[of the perfidious Oswald] I know thee. [I know what you are] (2.2.12).
(emphasis mine)
[of himself] To go out of my dialect, which you discommend so much. 
I know, sir, I am no flatterer [that is not what I am] (2.2.108). (emphasis mine)
[of a trustworthy knight] Sir, I know you. Where’s the king? [knows what
he is: trustworthy] (3.1.3). (emphasis mine)
The knight, challenging the secrecy of dealing with a disguised man, demands
to know who Kent is. Kent answers that soon he will learn what he desires to
know, and will be put at ease because he knows what Kent is. Indeed, he is a
man whose essence is so well known that he must disguise it; he cannot let the
others know who he is because they know what he is – loyal to Lear.
In addition, Cordelia, the repository of true worth, speaks the word first
in its ontological sense. Upon her own banishment, she says of her duplici-
tous sisters:
I know you what you are;
And like a sister am most loath to call
Your faults as they are named (1.1.271–2). (emphasis mine)
Finally, to Kent and Cordelia is added Edgar, who says “I know thee well”
(4.6.255) to Oswald, in the sense that he knows him for what he is–a
scoundrel; and even more to the point: “to know our enemies minds, we’d
rip their hearts” (4.6.255). But tellingly, the term is also used in the onto-
logical sense by Goneril, and her doing so makes a point about the use of
knowledge itself, even self-knowledge. When Lear storms away, having
been refused his knights, Goneril sends her lackey Oswald ahead to Regan,
to prepare her as a confederate. She does so because she “knows” Lear’s
heart (1.4.324), i.e., what he desires and intends. And this is because she
knows her own. What Lear desires is the retention of his position and
power; he will seek it in another place if he cannot find it in this. His desires
are something of which she has full understanding. That Goneril has seen
her own intentions and recognizes them in Lear exemplifies the fact that to
know one’s vices is not necessarily to reform them. Instead, they may be
embraced, as in her case.
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Taylor points out that from Augustine’s standpoint, “the perversity in the
will can never be sufficiently explained by our lack of insight into the good;
on the contrary, it makes us act below and against our insight, and prevents
this from becoming fuller and purer. This perversity can be described as a
drive to make ourselves the centre of our world, to relate everything to our-
selves, to dominate and possess the things which surround us.”41 And
again, most importantly, with regard to the search for self-knowledge,
Augustine was of the view that the soul can fail in the quest. The failure can
stem from a confusion of even knowing where to begin, what to look for –
a Meno’s paradox.42
To put it differently, the moral accounting that self-knowledge should
bring need not be undertaken. One might know what one is, as Edmund
does, and indulge what one is, rather than try to reform it. Similarly,
Edmund uses his “wits” to gain Edgar’s “lands” by subversion. Though
Lear scants reason and as a result loses his lands, Edmund is an example of
the forceful application of reason, working in complicity with the will, in
order to achieve a bad end.
In an interesting editorial guessing-game, one line is attributed to both
Edmund and Goneril, the former in the folio edition and the latter in the
quarto.43 At the play’s end, when confronted with the sedition that has
been wrought, one of them says: “Ask me not what I know,” a refusal to
have anything demanded of him/her, a refusal to look inside the self for
knowledge. For the Elizabethan, a refusal to take a self-accounting, particu-
larly one made at the last, when the final judgment is about to be made, is
the worst thing imaginable. Contrition for what one is must exist before
absolution can be given. If the line is spoken by Goneril, who is about to
become a suicide, she is reminiscent of Iago, unrepentant to the end. It is
less satisfying if spoken by Edmund, who is in the end somewhat converted
by hearing the tale of his father’s death, and of his brother’s compassion
towards him: “Some good I mean to do/ Despite of mine own nature”
(5.3.241–2). It seems, at the last, Edmund looks inside.
Even in Lear’s brief respite from lunacy, when he and Cordelia are car-
ried away to prison, he shows that he only apprehends the meanings, but
does not truly comprehend them. They are “caught” but not understood.
His world comes to mean Cordelia, whom he “catches” right before her
death (5.3.21), but he does not fully understand her still. When she demands
to confront her sisters, who have imprisoned them, Lear will not allow it:
No, no, no, no! Come, let’s away to prison:
We two alone will sing like birds I’ the cage:
When thou dost ask me blessing, I’ll kneel down,
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41. Taylor, Sources of the Self, 138–9.
42. Ibid., 134.
43. Foakes gives the line to Edmund, stating that Goneril has already shown she knows of
the paper that is proof of her seditious compact. King Lear (Foakes), 377.
And ask of thee forgiveness. So we’ll live,
And pray, and sing, and tell old tales, and laugh
At gilded butterflies, and hear poor rogues
Talk of court news; and we’ll talk with them too —
Who loses and who wins; who’s in, who’s out —
And take upon’s the mystery of things,
As if we were God’s spies. And we’ll wear out,
In a wall’d prison packs and sects of great ones,
That ebb and flow by the moon (5.3.8–19).
However beautiful his speech, Cordelia cannot be Lear’s private universe.
In light of what they face, what he proposes is surely an unrealistic flight of
fancy that could even be called inappropriate were it not so lovely, and so
long looked for in his appreciation of Cordelia. We so want to hear this
said to her, and for him to know something of her value, that we overlook
the fact that what he speaks of is another dream. Before, he has banished
her from his entire world, which has led to a chaos that cannot be mended
by his making her into his entire world. Lear goes from excess to excess.
He is not temperate, patient, which he asks again and again to be.44 In the
end, rather than confront what he must, know what he must, he refuses to
know at all, four times – “No, no, no, no!”
And what is it that he refuses to confront? That which he had 
thought was the “way to madness,” his daughters, Goneril and Regan, joint
rulers of the disintegrating realm. In not confronting them who are said to
“know his heart” (1.4.324) and who appreciate that he does not “know
himself” (1.1.295), he refuses to face a mirror of misrule, one he has
fashioned by his own hands. The irony is that only in so doing will he 
truly know himself. Contrary to what Lear is afraid of, in that way madness
does not lie. And by refusing this self-confrontation, he ensures the
destruction of all.
Of course, an ordinary person may function very well without “knowing”
himself in the Elizabethan sense, never endangering property or person,
nor risking certification for madness despite his ontological ignorance. But
the play suggests that the greater the person, the more invested with pos-
ition and authority, the more damaging such an ignorance may be. And
that is especially so for figures in Renaissance plays, particularly so in
Shakespearean tragedies, acutely so when a King. As Duncan Salkeld
explains, “[T]he insane in Renaissance tragedy were not merely victims of
a brutal society; they were also violent, murderous and politically danger-
ous.”45 For a commonplace of medieval and Renaissance thought was that
the King was the kingdom, and disorder in the sovereign corresponded to
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44. Taylor says “[Lear] still has a sense that dutiful daughters should pamper old fathers; this
time, the right one will.” Taylor, “Lear and the Lost Self,” 512.
45. Salkeld, Madness and Drama, 80.
disorder in the realm.46 Here, King Lear has brought that disorder on both
himself and his kingdom. In a real sense, for the Elizabethan, a failure to
know the self is a failure to know the realm; the failure to know what he is
jeopardizes his ability to rule justly, his capacity to judge correctly.
By way of an opposite example, Duke Vincentio in Measure for Measure is
instructive. For most of the play, the Duke, disguised as a friar, spies upon
his own kingdom. He does so in order to learn more of it. It is a knowledge
he has not acquainted himself with before, as he has lived a life removed,
cloistered away from his realm. The result of his de facto abdication of
responsibilities has been the ruin of Vienna, and has brought about the
misrule of his martinet deputy, Angelo. Only when the Duke learns of his
kingdom can he leave the “dark corners” of himself and remount the
throne. As his trusted retainer Escalus says of him, he is “one that, above
all other strifes, contended especially to know himself (3.2.226)” (emphasis
mine). His role as judge and governor is affirmed in his manifesto, given in
monologue. Central to it is the idea of the self as a base from which to make
judgments:
He who the sword of heaven will bear
Should be as holy as severe;
Pattern in himself to know,
Grace to stand, and virtue go;
More nor less to others paying
Than by self-offences weighing.
(3.2.254–9) (emphasis mine)47
This is precisely what Lear has not done and never learns to do. In fact,
Lear’s failure to know himself compromises his ability to know others, and
in the end, his ability to know anything at all. The breadth of this statement
is considerable, but justified, since the “self” is the staging ground for all
epistemological enquiry. Each self is the sole epistemological tool by which
knowledge can be gained. Our “selves” are all we have. Without an aware-
ness of how strong that tool is, and more importantly, how weak (it would
seem we know our strengths better than our weaknesses, as the former are
more gladly faced) decisions, choices, and assessments about the world will
be made from a false standing.
Stability and order are tied to self-knowledge, a correlation suited to
Shakespeare’s dramatic purposes. Without an ontological self awareness, a
person – particularly a person of power – cannot judge or know other
ontologies. Hamlet admits the connection when he says “to know a man
were to know himself.” (5.2.138). The very means by which determinations
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46. See generally Ernst Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political 
Theology (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University. Press, 1957).
47. Lever notes that the rhyming scheme here denotes a certain hieratic style. Measure for
Measure (Lever), n. 254. Prospero adopts it in his soliloquies in The Tempest. Ibid.
are made, of others, of the larger world, is compromised when there is
nothing – no self – to judge against; as Lear says to Cordelia, with Oedipal
irony, “Nothing” comes “of nothing” (1.1.90). All the King has as a base for
judgment is himself, and without that orientation, he cannot judge anything
rightly. Even a flimsy, faulty basis is a basis, and adjustments can be made
if the King knows where he stands. Without that, he is all at sea; worse, he
is under it, and lost as to which way the surface lies.
Judgment born of self-knowledge is the perspective of the Duke in Meas-
ure for Measure, and the one that prepares him not only to judge the cases
brought before him at the play’s close, but to govern his kingdom rightly
and to seek its health. If the sovereign knows himself, he knows how to
measure the world. Lear, on the other hand, has no idea how to measure
or distinguish, because he has no base “self” from which to measure. He
equates things that cannot be equated, distinguishes things that are not 
necessarily different: that bonds of flesh are not necessarily bonds of love; that
words are not deeds (though Regan speaks of them as though they are –
“She [Goneril] names my very deed of love” [1.1.56])48; that silence is not
perforce denial; that something cannot forsake its place and retain the
attributes of its place (i.e., a former king does not enjoy the prerogatives of
a reigning king).
Lear’s greatest mistake is the first one the audience sees, the “love trial.”
In this, Lear performs a monumental perversion of the law. He does so by
using one of its mechanisms, meant to ferret out transgressions against the
civil society and thereby preserve its goods, as the means by which to test
that which lies at the very heart of all human goods, love.49 The tribunal is
made the rack upon which love is tried, and it is fundamentally unfit for
the task. Lear’s tribunal asks what love is, an ontological inquiry of the
highest order. But as the love test shows, he is not actually interested in
ontologies, but in word games, the appearance of love, not the substance.
In contrast, Cordelia’s first words are ontological in nature: “What shall
Cordelia speak?” (1.1.62) (emphasis mine). The absurdity of this event is
only matched by its execution, as Lear is supremely unprepared to make
the proper judgment. Gloucester and Kent begin the play perplexed as to
the “measurement” that the King will make in his division of the land
(1.1.5). For his part, Lear perseveres in his “constant will” to publish his
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48. Foakes points out that the term also has the contractual connotation. King Lear (Foakes),
162 n. 71. The irony of the statement lies in the fact that there is a disjunction between
the res and the verba, the breach in meaning that creates a lie. See Harmon, Eternal
Bonds, True Contracts, 32, 145.
49. To the classical mind, goods were comparative: those which are good in and of them-
selves (honestum); those which are productive of good (utile) and those which are preser-
vative of good. Cicero borrows from Aristotle’s model in the Rhetorica in elaborating
upon these goods. Cicero, De Inventione, ed. H.M. Hubbell (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1949), 2.157. That model taken in conjunction with the theological
virtues (faith, hope, and love) would place love, “the greatest of these” according to the
New Testament, 1 Cor. 13:13, at the top of “goods in themselves.” Charles Taylor char-
acterizes these as “hypergoods.” Taylor, Sources of the Self , 63.
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50. Interestingly, in the courtly tradition, the great trials of love tend to be physical feats,
tasks, or deeds – conquering some foe, breaking some spell, obtaining some artifact –
not poetry contests. See Andreas Capellanus, The Art of Courtly Love, trans. John Jay
Parry 34–43 (New York: Frederick Unger, 1957). In matters of “higher” love, the same
proves true. Sir Galahad could attain the Holy Grail because of his deed-proven purity.
Sir Thomas Malory, Le Morte D’Arthur, ed. Janet Cowen (Baltimore: Penguin, 1969), vol. 2:
bk. 17, chaps. 20, 22. Edgar proves his own worth in a trial by combat at the end of the
play. Dorothy C. Hockey, “The Trial Pattern in King Lear,” Shakespeare Quarterly 10, 
no. 3 (1959): 393. The attempt to try love is not unlike the attempt to try faith by the
Court of High Commission, which used drastic measures to ensure religious conformity
with the Church of England. See Brian Cummings, “Swearing in Public: More and
Shakespeare,” ELH, 27 (1997) 107–233.
51. King Lear (Foakes), 17. Salkeld notes the similarities to the Renaissance revenge tragedy
Gorboduc, written by Norton and Sackville. Salkeld, Madness and Drama, 82–6. There, 
the King divides the kingdom equally among his sons despite being warned that “within
one land, one rule is best; divided reigns do make divided hearts.” Ibid., 83. But the
answer is ignored, and civil war ensues. Ibid., 84.
daughters’ inheritance, and sets before them the famous trial. But love is
not “proved” by rhetoric, and Lear is unaware of that fact.50 Sound judges,
of old and of late, demand proof, first-hand accountings, not empty hearsay
and puffery; yet Lear is content with the latter. This is so because he has no
knowledge of his weaknesses – how prone he is to flattery – and as such
cannot defense against it. As a result, he chooses what is pleasing to hear
rather than what is possible to know. His vanity is an easy mark for his eld-
est daughters to hit, and is matched by his irrational wrath, which proceeds
“dragon”-like until spent in dispossessing Cordelia (1.1.122). Appetitive
metaphors abound. Barbarians and those who “gorge” their “appetites”
with their own children will be more welcome to his bosom than she
(1.1.119); he even tells Cornwall and Albany to “digest” her “portion” of
the kingdom (1.1.129), revealing much of how he conceptualizes the realm.
Susceptible to both flattery and wrath, his misjudgment in the “trial” has
consequences, grave and great. There is even a sense in which the king
here is anarchist. He divides the realm and disinherits the one heir who is
worthy. To have sliced up the kingdom would alone be considered shock-
ing and unwise, but to divide a house between corrupt sovereigns, Regan
and Goneril, and to banish the only hope of the land, Cordelia, is to work
the destruction of all.51 There is something anti-Solomonic in this division,
a judge who madly insists on the division of the corpus despite what such
an act will effectuate. This is a primary offense in the sovereign/judge, to
lay waste to that which he holds as trustee; it is doubly committed in the
sense that Lear – who it must be remembered is Britain – “wastes” himself,
dividing his crown in two, and separating his wit from his will.
In this one act, Lear both distorts the mechanism of law, making it a
means to test society’s greatest end, love, and also commits a travesty of
epistemological enquiry. This initiates the crisis in sovereignty that unfolds.
Lear does not know how to discern love because he does not know how to
judge; he cannot judge because he has no basis from which to “see” rightly,
to compare and to measure, as Kent so adamantly advises him: “See better,
Lear, and let me still remain the true blank of thine eye” (1.1.159–60). In
essence, Kent is offering himself as a benchmark, a means for checking the
accuracy of the King’s perspective. This is necessary to prevent decisions
made in the blindness of wrath. But reason is banished here, and Lear pro-
ceeds, indulging his appetite. The two characters that see rightly, who
know things, are sent away: Kent and Cordelia. In so doing, the King cre-
ates the breach in order by which his sanity will be lost, and through which
raw, rapacious Nature will rush; this is her moment, and in the very next
scene Edmund, the illegitimate, heralds her arrival: “Thou, Nature, art my
Goddess” (1.2.1).
In other plays, a different kind of Nature has agents that help her effect
her purposes. As has been mentioned, in the problem plays, festive com-
edies, and romances, Nature as the principle of abundance seeks to bring
forth conjunction, the furtherance of a healthy society through production
and generation – marriage and children.52 Here too, in King Lear, tragic
Nature – the principle of appetite – has her agents, those who bring her
into full power through the fissure in reason Lear has wrought. Certainly,
the most obvious of these is Edmund, who shows his allegiance early, and
acts in most ways as a medieval vice figure.53 But though the most appar-
ent, he is not the most prominent. Both Lear and Gloucester, traitors to
themselves and to the kingdom, indulge “natural” habits opposed to rea-
son – Gloucester’s flip incontinence, Lear’s vanity and wrath – that reflect
the disorder to which they have brought themselves. Having scanted self-
knowledge, their natural selves are left to “grow and prosper,” as Edmund
would have it, and finally find physical manifestation. Gloucester’s internal
“blindness” results in the dispossession of his “lawful” son in preference to
his “natural son.” In the end, his inability to “see” becomes as literally true
as it has been metaphorically. Nature breaks into the world from the inside,
through Gloucester’s lusty eyes.
Likewise, Lear’s disordered mind is only a later manifestation of the 
irrationality he exhibits from the play’s beginning. F. David Hoeniger has
pointed out that an Elizabethan audience would understand Lear’s rash
decision, which provokes civil war by dividing the kingdom, as symptom-
atic of madness. Wrath was seen as a type of madness, brevis furor, in 
which reason was temporarily suspended altogether. The King’s disposses-
sion of his only worthy heir would confirm the diagnosis.54 Lear’s “mad”
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trial of the imaginary Goneril and Regan in 3.6 is only a subsequent under-
scoring of his irrationality in the opening love trial. His daughters are no
more truly “there” in the chambers of Tom’s hovel – presided over by a
fool, a madman, and a servant – than their true selves were “there” when
they spoke vain words to a foolish judge, Lear himself.55 In this context,
the legitimacy of Lear’s “will” at the play’s inception is all the more prob-
lematic. Under traditional English law, an “idiot,” i.e., one completely
bereft of his reasoning, could not bequeath, as he had lost the faculty of
right judgment; however, a “lunatic” could make a will during a period of
lucidity.56 As Adrian Lockhart says, “Lear himself is the false justicer who
let his daughter escape.”57 In the love trial, he has contented himself with
lies about what love is; now, in the mad trial, he vainly prosecutes those
that he had found in the “right.” He is caught in his own judgment.
Lear’s is a long, waking madness, and the audience only enters upon the
first of the last, the beginning of his final descent. Gloucester has always
been blind; Lear, always mad; tragic Nature breaches the physical borders
after all other known borders have already been transgressed – legal, polit-
ical, and familial. By slighting knowledge at its first and primary level of
enquiry, the self, Lear destroys the safeguard protecting the kingdom from
disorder. He in fact introduces that disorder through the breach that gives
Nature license, bringing about a breathtaking dissolution both in his mind
and in his kingdom. At every level there is a cleavage in the institutional
borders – law, nation, family – that are meant to protect and further the
society. The first dispersal is in twain, but from then on the divisions are
exponential: Lear from Cordelia, Lear from Kent, Regan and Goneril from
Cordelia, Edmund from Edgar, Gloucester from Edgar, Edmund from
Gloucester, Goneril from Lear, Cornwall from Albany, Regan from Lear,
Regan and Cornwall from Kent, Regan and Cornwall from Gloucester,
Regan from Goneril, Goneril from Albany, Edmund from Lear and
Cordelia, England from France.
Lear’s perversion of law, so that it becomes love’s rack, is a failure to app-
reciate law’s proper use and its built-in limits. Again, this is only a visible ex-
hibition of an innate irrationality – or better yet, an arationality – that flows
from his rejection of self-enquiry in favor of pure will/appetite. He cannot
know other things, or judge other things, because he has no basis from which
to make those judgments, no acquaintance with his true self and his dimin-
ished capacities. Through his resulting perversion of the law, tragic Nature
rushes, disordering all. That Lear’s sanity is among the first to sustain the blow
is not surprising, as it is the portal through which the enemy has made its way.
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(quoting Penelope Doob, Nebuchadnezzar’s Children: Conventions of Madness in Middle Eng-
lish Literature (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 29). This argument is support for
the dramatic marking in Renaissance plays to which Carol Thomas Neely alludes.
55. See Hockey, “Trial Pattern in King Lear,” 389–95; Andrienne Lockhart, “The Cat is
Grey: King lear’s Mad Trial Scene,” Shakespeare Quarterly 26, no. 4 (1975): 469–71.
56. George Dale Collinson, A Treatise on the Law Concerning Idiots, Lunatics, and Other Persons
Non Compotes Mentis (London: W. Reed, 1812), 612.
57. Lockhart, “The Cat is Grey,” 471.
Knowledge, especially self-knowledge, is often painful. Goneril even tells
Albany that he should not “afflict” himself to know the reason for her
behavior (1.4.283). As a result, self-knowledge is customarily avoided; it is
easier to live with the illusion. One thing that Lear avoids seeing is the pic-
ture of corrupt rule that he has made, the mirror that his reigning daugh-
ters would present to him if he were to stand in their presence.58 But further
yet, beyond this first interior view lies another, one that Lear does in fact
confront, but characteristically turns from.
It occurs on the heath, just after he has stated, mistakenly, that he will
avoid the way to madness by refusing to dwell on his misfortunes. As the
wind blows and the thunder strikes, Edgar emerges as Poor Tom – dispos-
sessed, maligned, reduced to nothing. In this, Tom is both essential man,
and essential world – what Lear has brought himself to, and what he has
brought his world to. He has taken “care” of neither, the foremost respon-
sibility of the sovereign. And from this, Lear’s mind turns completely; he
projects his own suffering onto Tom, and Tom’s suffering not onto Tom,
but onto Tom’s daughters. Lear falls to madness rather than rise to under-
standing, and ends up in the very place – fulminating at filial ingratitude –
that he had so feared.
It is Edgar who stands at the heart of Lear’s being, and Edgar who con-
fesses a knowledge of self that Lear never comes to, in fact runs from:
“Know, my name is lost.” (5.3.121) (emphasis mine). His birthright has been
stolen from him, his identity robbed, and all that he has, taken. He has had
to pretend madness to disguise himself amid the chaos, to survive a world
gone mad. His is the plight of fallen man, soiled, dispossessed, reduced to a
“bare forked animal.” At the nadir of self, Edgar’s way back is torturous, 
a bloody struggle against bare-fanged Nature, whom he must finally van-
quish in the form of her agent, his brother Edmund. Edgar’s personal fight
for “being” becomes an emblem for all contests between wit and will. His
agony goes the core of his “self,” and is achieved with great ceremony, 
a ritual of reclamation as mystical as it is formal.
Edgar as wretch is precisely what Lear must see. Instead, the King’s wits
turn at the sight, and bring him phantoms with which he is more comfort-
able – rages against the injustices done him. In this, the law-giver, the judge
and safeguard of the realm, accedes to the transgresses of tragic Nature,
and reveals the “way” that the law must avoid. It must stand with reason to
protect the good, not become the means by which the will has its say. In
that tragic event, the law is owned, part and parcel, by the appetite. Even-
tually, the appetite will make its claim in the fashion of Lear’s chosen heir:
“the laws are mine . . . who can arraign me for’t?” (5.3.156) In such a claim,
Nature lurks; in such a claim, tragedy awaits.
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58. The commonplace book meant to caution monarchs by showing them their fault-filled
predecessors was William Baldwin, A Mirror for Magistrates, ed. Lily B. Campbell 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938).
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